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Abstract. In this paper, some epistemic extensions of Go¨del
logic are introduced. We establish two proof systems and show
that these logics are sound with respect to an appropriate Kripke
semantics. Furthermore, we demonstrate weak completeness theo-
rems, that is if a formula ϕ is valid then its double negation ¬¬ϕ
is provable. A fuzzy version of muddy children puzzle is given and
using this, it is shown that the positive and negative introspections
are not valid. We enrich the language of epistemic Go¨del logic with
two connectives for group and common Knowledge and give corre-
sponding semantics for them. We leave the problem of soundness
and completeness in this general setting open. Finally, an action
model approach is introduced to establish a dynamic extension of
epistemic Go¨del logic.
1. Introduction
Many modal extensions of fuzzy logics have been introduced in the
literature. In [3, 4, 5, 6], some modal extensions of Go¨del fuzzy logic
are presented. Some modal extensions of Lukasiewicz logic are studied
in [16, 17], where a classical accessibility relation semantics is used.
In [22], some modal extensions of product fuzzy logic by using both
relational and algebraic semantics are studied. The relational seman-
tics of these extensions is based on Kripke structures with classical
accessibility relations. In [11], Hajek proposes a fuzzy variant of each
recursively axiomatized logic extending S5. [23] studies some modal
logics over MTL, where the semantics is based on Kripke structures
with truth values in [0,1] and classical accessibility relations.
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In this paper, some epistemic extensions of propositional Go¨del logic
are introduced with both fuzzy propositions and fuzzy accessibility re-
lations. The main new fuzzification made in this paper, is fuzzifying the
precondition function of an epistemic action in the introduced dynamic
epistemic
In Section 2, we first propose a language for an epistemic extension of
Go¨del fuzzy logic and give a Kripke semantics while both propositions
at the possible worlds and accessibility relations are fuzzy taking values
in [0,1]. Accessibility relations are not necessarily symmetric, since the
amount of indistinguishing may differ in different worlds. Also, a fuzzy
version of popular muddy children puzzle is proposed to show that some
formulas including positive and negative introspection are not valid. In
the sequel of the section, we propose two axiom systems which are
sound with respect to the corresponding semantics. Also, we obtain
weak completeness theorems, in the sense that if a formula ϕ is valid
then ¬¬ϕ is provable. Section 3 is devoted to the soundness and weak
completeness theorems.
In Section 4, we expand the language of epistemic Go¨del logic with
two connectives for group and common knowledge. The corresponding
semantics is presented, but the problem of soundness and completeness
are left open in this setting.
In Section 5, we introduce an action model approach to give a dy-
namic extension of epistemic Go¨del logic. The language of an action
model includes formulas with G(ϕ) = g and G(ϕ) > g notations. In-
tuitively, these formulas inform the agents about the truth values of
pre-conditions. Furthermore, we show the validity of some formulas
which are similar to some axioms of the proof system AMC [7]. Fi-
nally, by considering the agents with hearing impairment, we give an
example that our fuzzy muddy children puzzle is updated after some
announcements.
We assume that the reader is familiar with basic facts on the classical
modal logic, see e.g. [1]. The main reference for the Go¨del logic is [12].
In particular, we have the following theorems in Go¨del logic which we
will use in our proofs;
[(G2)] (ϕ ∧ψ)→ ϕ[(G4)] (ϕ → (ψ → χ))↔ ((ϕ ∧ ψ)→ χ)[(GT1)] ψ → (ϕ → ψ)[(GT2)] (ϕ→ ψ)→ (¬ψ → ¬ϕ)[(GT3)] ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (ϕ → ¬ψ)[(GT4)] (¬¬ϕ ∧ ¬¬ψ)↔ ¬¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)[(GT5)] ¬¬(ϕ → ψ)↔ (¬¬ϕ → ¬¬ψ)
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[(GT6)] ϕ→ ¬¬ϕ[(GT7)] ¬ϕ↔ ¬¬¬ϕ[(GT8)] ¬(ϕ → ψ)→ (¬ϕ → ψ)
Throughout this paper, it is assumed that P is a set of atomic propo-
sitions and A is a set of agents, unless otherwise stated.
2. Epistemic Go¨del logic
2.1. Semantics of epistemic Go¨del logic.
Definition 2.1. The language of epistemic Go¨del logic (EGL) is gen-
erated by the following BNF:
ϕ ∶∶= p ∣  ∣ ϕ ∧ϕ ∣ ϕ→ ϕ ∣ Baϕ
where, p ∈ P and a ∈ A.
Note that the language of EGL is an expansion of the language of
Go¨del logic. It is enriched by all epistemic connectives Ba, where a ∈ A.
Further connectives ¬, ∨ and ↔ are defined as similar as GL [12].
Definition 2.2. (EGL Model) An EGL-model is a structure M =(S, ra∣a∈A , pi), where
● S is a set of states,
● ra∣a∈A ∶ S ×S → [0,1] is a which assigns a value in [0,1] to each(s, s′) ∈ S × S. We call it the indistinguishing function.
● pi ∶ S ×P → [0,1] is a valuation function which assigns a truth
value to each atomic proposition p ∈ P, in every state s ∈ S.
The valuation function pi, can be extended to all formulas naturally,
denoted by V . The model M is called reflexive if for all a ∈ A and all
s ∈ S, ra(s, s) = 1.
Let M = (S, ra∣a∈A , pi) be an EGL-model. For each state s ∈ S and
each formula ϕ, we use the notation Vs(ϕ) for V (s,ϕ), which is defined
as follows:
● Vs(p) = pi(s, p); p ∈ P
● Vs(ϕ ∧ ψ) = min{Vs(ϕ), Vs(ψ)}
● Vs(ϕ→ ψ) = { 1 Vs(ϕ) ≤ Vs(ψ)Vs(ψ) Vs(ϕ) > Vs(ψ)
● Vs(¬ϕ) = { 0 Vs(ϕ) > 01 Vs(ϕ) = 0
● Vs(ϕ ∨ ψ) = max{Vs(ϕ), Vs(ψ)}
● Vs(Ba(ϕ)) =min
s′∈S
max{1 − ra(s, s′), Vs′(ϕ)}
Note that ¬ϕ and so ¬¬ϕ take the crisp values.
Definition 2.3. Let ϕ be an EGL-formula and M = (S, ra∣a∈A , pi) be
an EGL-model.
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(1) If s ∈ S, we say ϕ is valid in the pointed model (M,s); notation(M,s) ⊧ ϕ, if Vs(ϕ) = 1.
(2) ϕ is M-valid; notation M ⊧ ϕ, if for each state s′ ∈ S, (M,s′) ⊧
ϕ.
(3) IfM is a class of models, we say ϕ isM-valid; notationM⊧ ϕ,
if for all M ′ ∈M, M ′ ⊧ ϕ.
(4) ϕ is EGL-valid; notation ⊧ ϕ, if for each EGL-modelM∗, M∗ ⊧
ϕ.
Example 2.4. (A fuzzy muddy children) Let A = {a1, . . . , ak} be a
set of children (agents) with muddy faces. The agents may be visually
impaired. We consider n intervals with equal length except the first
zero-length interval. Suppose that (βi, βi+1]; 0 ≤ i ≤ n−1; be the desired
intervals, which βis satisfy the following conditions:
β0 = β1 = 0, βi+1 − βi =
1
n − 1
(1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1)
For each 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, we name the interval (βi, βi+1] by βi+1, then let
R = {βi ∣ 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. We consider S = {(tj)1≤j≤k ∣ tj ∈ R} as the set
of possible worlds. Also, corresponding to each agent aj ,1 ≤ j ≤ k, we
consider an atomic proposition mj , which intuitively means ”the face
of the agent aj is muddy”. Let P = {mj ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ k} be the set of atomic
propositions. Then, the valuation function pi ∶ S ×P → [0,1] is defined
as follows:
pi((tj)1≤j≤k,mi) = ti (1 ≤ i ≤ k)
Suppose that α ∈ (0,1) and for each a ∈ A, Ba ∈ [0,1] is the amount
of visual impairment of the agent a. Also, let s1 = (t1j)1≤j≤k and s2 =(t2j)1≤j≤k be two states in S. Then, the indistinguishing functions are
defined as follows:
rs1s2aiaj = { Bai(1 − α∣t
1
j − t
2
j ∣) t1j ≠ t2j
1 t1j = t
2
j
where, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, j ≠ i
rai(s1, s2) =min{rs1s2aiaj ∣ 1 ≤ j ≤ k, j ≠ i} where, 1 ≤ i ≤ k
Note that the indistinguishing functions defined above are compatible
with our intuition, becausethe more the difference between the amounts
of mud on the faces of the other agents, the easier it is to distinguish
the states exactly.
Proposition 2.5. The following schemes are not EGL-valid.
(1) Baϕ→ BaBaϕ
(2) ¬Baϕ→ Ba(¬Baϕ)
(3) Ba(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ Baϕ ∨Baψ
(4) ¬Baϕ→ Ba¬ϕ
(5) Baϕ ∨Ba¬ϕ
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(6) ϕ→ Ba¬Ba¬ϕ
Proof. We construct an EGL-model M ′ as the Example 2.4. Let n = 3,
A = {a, b}, Ba = 0.4, Bb = 0.9 and α = 0.2. Then, S = {(i, j) ∣ i, j ∈
{0,0.5,1}}, and for arbitrary states s1 = (x, y) and s2 = (x′, y′) in S,
the indistinguishing functions are defined as follows:
ra(s1, s2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 ∣y − y′∣ = 0
0.36 ∣y − y′∣ = 0.5
0.32 ∣y − y′∣ = 1 rb(s1, s2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 ∣x − x′∣ = 0
0.81 ∣x − x′∣ = 0.5
0.72 ∣x − x′∣ = 1
It can be shown that some instances of the desired schemes fail to be
valid in the model M ′. For each part we find an state s ∈ S and a
formula ϕ such that (M ′, s) ⊭ ϕ.
(1): We show that the formula Bbma → BbBbma is not valid in (M ′, (1,1)).
The following statements hold:
V(0,0)(Bbma) = V(0,0.5)(Bbma) = V(0,1)(Bbma) = 0,
V(0.5,0)(Bbma) = V(0.5,0.5)(Bbma) = V(0.5,1)(Bbma) = 0.19,
V(1,0)(Bbma) = V(1,0.5)(Bbma) = V(1,1)(Bbma) = 0.28.
Therefore, V(1,1)(BbBbma) = 0.19, and because V(1,1)(Bbma) > V(1,1)(BbBbma),
it can be concluded that V(1,1)(Bbma → BbBbma) = 0.19.
Similarly, the following counter examples contradict EGL-validity of
the schemes in parts 2-6:
(2) V(0.5,0)(¬Bamb → Ba(¬Bamb)) = 0.64
(3) V(0,0)(Bb(ma ∨ (ma →mb))→ Bbma ∨Bb(ma →mb)) = 0.19
(4) V(0,0)(¬Bbma → Bb¬ma) = 0.19
(5) V(0.5,0)(Bbma ∨Bb¬ma) = 0.19
(6) V(1,0)(ma → Bb¬Bb¬ma) = 0.28 
Remark 2.6. Note that positive introspection and negative introspection
are not EGL-valid, by Proposition 2.5.
Proposition 2.7. Let ϕ be an EGL-formula. The following formulas
are valid in all EGL-models.
(1) Baϕ ∧Ba(ϕ→ ψ)→ Baψ(2) Ba(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Baϕ→ Baψ)(3)¬¬Ba¬¬ϕ → ¬¬Baϕ(4) Ba(ϕ ∧ψ)↔ Baϕ ∧Baψ.
Proof. We only show that the formula in part (1) is EGL-valid. The
validity of the other parts can be shown similarly. Suppose that M =(S, ra∣a∈A , pi) is an EGL-model and s ∈ S. We show that Baϕ ∧Ba(ϕ →
ψ) → Baψ is valid in the pointed model (M,s). Let Γ = {s′ ∈ S ∣
Vs′(ϕ) > Vs′(ψ)}, then
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Vs(Ba(ϕ→ ψ)) = { mins′∈Γ max{1 − ra(s, s
′), Vs′(ψ)} Γ ≠ φ
1 Γ = φ
If Γ = φ, then Vs(Baϕ ∧ Ba(ϕ → ψ)) = Vs(Baϕ) and also ∀t ∈
S Vt(ϕ) ≤ Vt(ψ). So, it can be obtained that ∀s ∈ S Vs(Baϕ) ≤
Vs(Baψ). Hence, Vs(Baϕ ∧ Ba(ϕ → ψ)) ≤ Vs(Baψ) and so Vs(Baϕ ∧
Ba(ϕ → ψ)→ Baψ) = 1. Otherwise, if Γ ≠ φ then
Vs(Baϕ ∧Ba(ϕ→ ψ))
= min{min{min
s′∈Γ
max{1 − ra(s, s′), Vs′(ϕ)},min
s′∈Γc
max{1 − ra(s, s′), Vs′(ϕ)}},
min
s′∈Γ
max{1 − ra(s, s′), Vs′(ψ)}}
= min{min
s′∈Γ
max{1 − ra(s, s′), Vs′(ϕ)},min
s′∈Γc
max{1 − ra(s, s′), Vs′(ϕ)},
min
s′∈Γ
max{1 − ra(s, s′), Vs′(ψ)}}.
Now, If s′ ∈ Γ, then Vs′(ψ) < Vs′(ϕ) and so
min
s′∈Γ
max{1 − ra(s, s′), Vs′(ψ)} ≤min
s′∈Γ
max{1 − ra(s, s′), Vs′(ϕ)}
Therefore,
Vs(Baϕ ∧Ba(ϕ → ψ)) =
min{min
s′∈Γ
max{1 − ra(s, s′), Vs′(ψ)},min
s′∈Γc
max{1 − ra(s, s′), Vs′(ϕ)}}.
Also, if s′ ∈ Γc, then Vs′(ϕ) ≤ Vs′(ψ) and so
min
s′∈Γc
max{1 − ra(s, s′), Vs′(ϕ)} ≤min
s′∈Γc
max{1 − ra(s, s′), Vs′(ψ)}
Consequently, it can be concluded that Vs(Baϕ∧Ba(ϕ→ ψ)) ≤ Vs(Baψ),
which completes the proof. 
Remark 2.8. The scheme Ba(ϕ) → ϕ is valid in all reflexive EGL-
models.
2.2. The proof systems. Let ϕ, ψ be EGL-formulas and a ∈ A. Con-
sider the following axiom schemes and inference rules:(A1) all instantiations of propositional Go¨del logic tautologies,(A2) Baϕ ∧Ba(ϕ→ ψ)→ Baψ(A3) ¬¬Ba¬¬ϕ → ¬¬Baϕ(A4) Baϕ→ ϕ
(R1) ϕ ϕ→ ψ
ψ
(MP )
(R2) ϕ
Baϕ
(B)
We consider a proof system BF which has (A1), (A2) and (A3) as its
EPISTEMIC EXTENSION OF GO¨DEL LOGIC 7
axiom schemes and both inference rules (R1) and (R2). The system
TF is an extension of BF by the extra axiom scheme (A4). The axiom
(A4), intuitively means that the completely known facts are completely
true.
Note that the formulas in the first axiom (A1) are not only in the
language of propositional Go¨del logic, but in the language of EGL.
From now on we assume that D is the system BF or TF , unless
otherwise stated. A derivation of a formula ϕ from a set of formulas Γ
within system D is defined naturally; notation Γ ⊢D ϕ. If the system
D is clear form the context, we just write Γ ⊢ ϕ.
Definition 2.9. Let ϕ,ϕ1, . . . , ϕn be formulas in the language of EGL.
(1) ϕ is D-consistent if ⊬D ¬ϕ,(2) A finite set {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} is D-consistent if ϕ1∧. . .∧ϕn is D-consistent,(3) An infinite set Γ of formulas is D-consistent if any finite subset of
Γ is D-consistent,(4) A formula or a set of formulas is called D-inconsistent if it is not
D-
consistent,(5) A set Γ of formulas is maximally D-consistent if:
(a) Γ is D-consistent,
(b) Γ ∪ {ψ} is D-inconsistent for any formula ψ ∉ Γ.
If there is no ambiguity, we say consistent/inconsistent instead of
D-consistent/D-inconsistent.
Lemma 2.10. (1) Every consistent set of formulas can be extended to
a maximally consistent set. (2) Let Γ be a maximally consistent set of
formulas, then the following statements hold for all EGL-formulas ϕ,
ψ:
(a) either ϕ ∈ Γ or ¬ϕ ∈ Γ,
(b) ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ ⇔ ϕ ∈ Γ and ψ ∈ Γ,
(c) if ϕ ∈ Γ and ϕ→ ψ ∈ Γ then ψ ∈ Γ,
(d) Γ is closed under deduction, i.e. if Γ ⊢ ϕ then ϕ ∈ Γ.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1.4.3 of [19]. 
3. Soundness and completeness
LetM be a class of EGL-models. The system D is called:
● sound with respect toM, if ⊢ ϕ thenM⊧ ϕ,
● complete with respect toM, ifM⊧ ϕ then ⊢ ϕ,
● weak complete with respect toM, ifM⊧ ϕ then ⊢ ¬¬ϕ.
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Lemma 3.1. The inference rules (R1) and (R2) are admissible, i.e.
for each rule if all premises are EGL-valid, then its conclusion is also
EGL-valid.
Proof. The proof is obvious. 
Theorem 3.2. (Soundness)
(1) BF is sound with respect to the class of all EGL-models
(2) TF is sound with respect to the class of all reflexive EGL-models.
Proof. The proof is obtained in a straightforward manner by applying
Proposition 2.7, Remark 2.8 and Lemma 3.1. 
Lemma 3.3. (Model Existence Lemma) The following statements
are equivalent:(1) If ⊧ ϕ, then ⊢ ¬¬ϕ,(2) if ⊬ ¬¬ϕ then there is an EGL-model M = (S, ra∣a∈A , pi) and a state
s ∈ S
such that (M,s) ⊭ ϕ,(3) if ¬¬ϕ is consistent then it is satisfiable, i.e. there is an EGL-model
M = (S, ra∣a∈A , pi) and a state s ∈ S such that (M,s) ⊧ ¬¬ϕ.
Proof. (1) and (2) are obviously equivalent. For convention, we use
the notation ”∃M ∃s” to mean ”there exists an EGL-model M =(S, ra∣a∈A , pi) and a state s ∈ S”.
(2)⇒(3). We restate the statements (2) and (3) as follows, respectively:
⊬ ¬¬ϕ Ô⇒ ∃M ∃s Vs(ϕ) ≠ 1⊬ ¬¬¬ϕ Ô⇒ ∃M ∃s Vs(¬¬ϕ) = 1
Assume that (2) holds, then
⊬ ¬¬ϕ Ô⇒ ∃M ∃s Vs(¬ϕ) = { 0 0 < Vs(ϕ) < 11 Vs(ϕ) = 0
Replacing ϕ by ¬ϕ gives rise to
⊬ ¬¬¬ϕ Ô⇒ ∃M ∃s Vs(¬¬ϕ) = { 0 0 < Vs(¬ϕ) < 11 Vs(¬ϕ) = 0
But since ¬ϕ takes crisp value, the case where 0 < Vs(¬ϕ) < 1 never
happens. Therefore,⊬ ¬¬¬ϕ Ô⇒ ∃M ∃s Vs(¬¬ϕ) = 1
(3)⇒(2). Assume that (3) holds, then ⊬ ¬¬¬ϕ implies that ∃M ∃s Vs(¬ϕ) =
0. Replacing ϕ by ¬ϕ, it can be obtained that
⊬ ¬¬¬¬ϕ Ô⇒ ∃M ∃s Vs(¬¬ϕ) = 0
Therefore, ⊬ ¬¬ϕ implies that ∃M ∃s Vs(ϕ) ≠ 1, which completes the
proof. 
EPISTEMIC EXTENSION OF GO¨DEL LOGIC 9
Theorem 3.4. (Weak Completeness) BF is weak complete with
respect to the class of all EGL-models.
Proof. By model existence lemma, it is enough to show that for each
formula ϕ, if ¬¬ϕ is consistent then ¬¬ϕ is satisfiable. By Lemma 2.10
part (1), it is sufficient to show that for each maximally consistent set
Φ of formulas, the set of all double negated formulas contained in Φ
is satisfiable. This is obtained by constructing a so-called canonical
EGL-model. The canonical EGL-model M c = (Sc, rc
a∣a∈A
, pic) is defined
as follows:
● Sc = {sΘ ∣ Θ is a maximally consistent set of formulas}
● rc
a∣a∈A
(sΘ, sΨ) = { 1 Θ/Ba ⊆ Ψ0 otherwise , where Θ/Ba = {¬¬ϕ ∣ ¬¬Baϕ ∈ Θ},
● pic(sΘ, p) = { 1 ¬¬p ∈ Θ0 ¬¬p ∉ Θ , where p ∈ P.
pic can be extended to all formulas, naturally. As before we use the
notation V for its extension. Note that pic and V take crisp values.
Now it is enough to show that for each formula ϕ and each sΘ ∈ Sc the
following statement holds:
VsΘ(¬¬ϕ) = 1 ⇔ ¬¬ϕ ∈ Θ
We prove it by induction on the structure of ϕ:
Case 1: ϕ = p, where p ∈ P:
VsΘ(¬¬p) = 1 ⇔ VsΘ(p) > 0 ⇔ VsΘ(p) = 1 ⇔ pic(sΘ, p) = 1 ⇔ ¬¬p ∈ Θ
Case 2: ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2
VsΘ(¬¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)) = 1 ⇔ VsΘ(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2) > 0 ⇔ VsΘ(ϕ1) > 0, VsΘ(ϕ2) > 0 ⇔
VsΘ(¬¬ϕ1) = 1, VsΘ(¬¬ϕ2) = 1 ⇔ ¬¬ϕ1,¬¬ϕ2 ∈ Θ (induction hypothesis)
⇔ ¬¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬¬ϕ2 ∈ Θ (maximal consistency of Θ)
⇔ ¬¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) ∈ Θ ((GT4) and maximal consistency of Θ)
Case 3: ϕ = ϕ1 → ϕ2
(⇐) Let ¬¬(ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∈ Θ, then using (GT5) and maximal consis-
tency of Θ it is concluded that
¬¬ϕ1 → ¬¬ϕ2 ∈ Θ (3.1)
Assume that VsΘ(¬¬(ϕ1 → ϕ2)) = 0. Then, VsΘ(ϕ1 → ϕ2) = 0 and so it
is demonstrated that VsΘ(ϕ1) = 1, VsΘ(ϕ2) = 0. Hence VsΘ(¬¬ϕ1) = 1
and VsΘ(¬¬ϕ2) = 0. By induction hypothesis, ¬¬ϕ1 ∈ Θ and then by
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applying Lemma 2.10, the statement (3.1) and the maximal consis-
tency of Θ, it is concluded that ¬¬ϕ2 ∈ Θ. Consequently, by induction
hypothesis VsΘ(¬¬ϕ2) = 1, contradicting the assumption.
(⇒) Assume that VsΘ(¬¬(ϕ1 → ϕ2)) = 1, then VsΘ(ϕ1 → ϕ2) = 1.
Thus it is obtained that either VsΘ(ϕ2) = 1 or VsΘ(ϕ1) = VsΘ(ϕ2) = 0.
If VsΘ(ϕ2) = 1, it is derived that VsΘ(¬¬ϕ2) = 1 and then by induction
hypothesis ¬¬ϕ2 ∈ Θ. Since ¬¬ϕ2 → (¬¬ϕ1 → ¬¬ϕ2) is an instance
of (GT1), then maximal consistency of Θ results in ¬¬ϕ1 → ¬¬ϕ2 ∈
Θ. Therefore, by (GT5) we obtain ¬¬(ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∈ Θ. In the other
case, if VsΘ(ϕ1) = VsΘ(ϕ2) = 0, by absurd hypothesis suppose that
¬¬(ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∉ Θ. Hence, by maximal consistency of Θ it is obtained
that ¬(ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∈ Θ. Then by applying (GT8) and (GT6), ¬ϕ1 →
ϕ2 ∈ Θ and ¬¬(¬ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∈ Θ, respectively. Now, by case 3, we have
VsΘ(¬¬(¬ϕ1 → ϕ2)) = 1 and hence VsΘ(¬ϕ1 → ϕ2) = 1, contradicting
the assumption VsΘ(ϕ1) = VsΘ(ϕ2) = 0.
Case 4: ϕ = Baψ
(⇐) Assume that ¬¬Baψ ∈ Θ, then ¬¬ψ ∈ Θ/Ba. Let Ψ be an
arbitrary maximally consistent set of formulas and sΨ ∈ Sc. Then we
have:
rca(sΘ, sΨ) = 1 ⇒ ¬¬ψ ∈ Θ/Ba ⊆ Ψ ⇒ VsΨ(¬¬ψ) = 1 (induction hypothesis)
⇒ VsΨ(ψ) = 1
Consequently, VsΘ(Baψ) = min
sΨ∈Sc
max{1 − rca(sΘ, sΨ), VsΨ(ψ)} = 1, so
VsΘ(¬¬Baψ) = 1.
(⇒) Assume that VsΘ(¬¬Baψ) = 1.
Claim: Θ/Ba ∪ {¬¬¬ψ} is inconsistent.
Proof of the Claim. Suppose that Θ/Ba∪{¬¬¬ψ} is consistent. Then by
lemma 2.10 there exists a maximally consistent extension Ψ such that
Θ/Ba ⊆ Θ/Ba ∪ {¬¬¬ψ} ⊆ Ψ. Thus, rca(sΘ, sΨ) = 1 and ¬¬¬ψ ∈ Ψ. By
induction hypothesis VsΨ(¬¬¬ψ) = 1 and then VsΨ(ψ) = 0. Therefore,
VsΘ(Baψ) = min
sΨ∈Sc
max{1 − rca(sΘ, sΨ), VsΨ(ψ)} = 0
and it is concluded that VsΘ(¬¬Baψ) = 0, which contradicts the as-
sumption. ∎Claim
Consequently, it follows that there is some inconsistent finite subset
∆ of Θ/Ba ∪ {¬¬¬ψ}, let ∆ = {¬¬ϕ1, . . . ,¬¬ϕk,¬¬¬ψ}. Note that
without loss of generality, we assume that ∆ contains ¬¬¬ψ. Hence
⊢ ¬(¬¬ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬¬ϕk ∧ ¬¬¬ψ).
By (GT4), (GT6) and transitivity rule it can be obtained that
⊢ (ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk ∧ ¬ψ)→ (¬¬ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬¬ϕk ∧ ¬¬¬ψ)
So applying (GT2) yields
⊢ ¬(¬¬ϕ1∧, . . . ,∧¬¬ϕk ∧ ¬¬¬ψ) → ¬(ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk ∧ ¬ψ)
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Hence, it can be concluded that ⊢ ¬(ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk ∧ ¬ψ), and then
⊢ ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → (. . . (ϕk → ¬¬ψ) . . .)), by using (GT3). Consequently
by applying (R2) we obtain ⊢ Ba(ϕ1 → ξ), where ξ is ϕ2 → (. . . (ϕk →
¬¬ψ) . . .)). Then ⊢ ¬¬Ba(ϕ1 → ξ), by (GT6). Since Θ is a maximally
consistent set, then by Lemma 2.10 the following statement holds
¬¬Ba(ϕ1 → ξ) ∈ Θ (3.2)
Also from ¬¬ϕ1, . . . ,¬¬ϕk ∈ Θ/Ba, it is demonstrated that
¬¬Baϕ1, . . . ,¬¬Baϕk ∈ Θ (3.3)
Thus, we have
⊢ Baϕ1 ∧Ba(ϕ1 → ξ)→ Baξ (instance of (A2))
⊢ Baϕ1 → (Ba(ϕ1 → ξ)→ Baξ) (by (G4))
⊢ ¬¬(Baϕ1 → (Ba(ϕ1 → ξ)→ Baξ)) (by (GT6))
⊢ ¬¬Baϕ1 → (¬¬Ba(ϕ1 → ξ)→ ¬¬Baξ) (by (GT5))
Therefore,
¬¬Baϕ1 → (¬¬Ba(ϕ1 → ξ)→ ¬¬Baξ) ∈ Θ. (3.4)
By (3.3), (3.4) and the maximal consistency of Θ it follows that:
¬¬Ba(ϕ1 → ξ)→ ¬¬Baξ ∈ Θ (3.5)
Also, by (3.2), (3.5) and the maximal consistency of Θ it can be con-
cluded that ¬¬Baξ ∈ Θ. Repetitive application of the above pro-
cess yields ¬¬Ba¬¬ψ ∈ Θ and then by using (A3) we conclude that
¬¬Baψ ∈ Θ, which completes the proof. 
Theorem 3.5. TF is weak complete with respect to the class of all
reflexive EGL-models.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.4, except for the
indistinguishing functions of canonical model. We must consider the
following condition in our canonical model:
∀a ∈ A ∀s ∈ Sc rca(s, s) = 1 
4. EGL with common knowledge
Let B ⊆ A. We add two connectives EBϕ and CBϕ to the language
of EGL, which mean ”every agents in B knows ϕ” and ”ϕ is common
knowledge between the agents of B”, respectively. We call this ex-
tension the epistemic Go¨del logic with common knowledge, denoted by
CEGL.
12 H. FARAHANI, A. H. SHARAFI AND R. A. BORZOOEI
Definition 4.1. The CEGL-formulas are defined as follows:
ϕ ∶∶= p ∣  ∣ ϕ ∧ϕ ∣ ϕ→ ϕ ∣ Baϕ ∣ EBϕ ∣ CBϕ
where, p ∈ P and a ∈ A. Notice that the connective EB can be defined
in terms of Bas, that is EB(ϕ) = ⋀a∈BBaϕ.
Definition 4.2. (CEGL-Model) A CEGL-model is a structure M =(S, ra∣a∈A , pi), which its parameters are defined as an EGL-model, but
the extension V of pi is also defined for two new connectives EB and
CB as follows:
● Vs(EBϕ) =min
b∈B
Vs(Bbϕ)
● Vs(CBϕ) = inf i∈NEiBϕ
where, for each i ∈ N, Ei
B
ϕ = EBEB...EBϕ (i times).
Proposition 4.3. The following rules are admissible in CEGL, that
is if the premise of a rule is CEGL-valid, then its conclusion is also
CEGL-valid.
(1)
ϕ
EBϕ
(E)
(2)
ϕ
CBϕ
(C)
Proof. The proof is straightforward. 
Lemma 4.4. Let ϕ,ψ be formulas in the language of CEGL. The fol-
lowing statements hold:
(1) EBϕ→ ϕ is valid in all reflexive CEGL-models.
(2) CBϕ→ ϕ is valid in all reflexive CEGL-models.
(3) For each n ∈ N, the formula En
B
(ϕ→ ψ)∧En
B
ϕ→ En
B
ψ is CEGL-
valid.
(4) En
B
(ϕ→ ψ)→ (En
B
ϕ→ En
B
ψ) is CEGL-valid.
Proof. Parts (1) and (2) can be proved easily. Parts (3) and (4) are
equivalent, by using (G4). So we only prove the part (3). Let M =(S, ra∣a∈A , pi) be a CEGL-model and s ∈ S. We show by induction on n
that Vs(EnB(ϕ→ ψ) ∧EnBϕ→ EnBψ) = 1.
(Basis) By (A2), Vs(Bb(ϕ → ψ) ∧ Bbϕ → Bbψ) = 1, for each b ∈ B.
Therefore,
min{Vs(Bb(ϕ→ ψ)), Vs(Bbϕ)} ≤ Vs(Bbψ)
Ô⇒min
b∈B
{min{Vs(Bb(ϕ→ ψ)), Vs(Bbϕ)}} ≤ min
b∈B
{Vs(Bbψ)}
Ô⇒min{min
b∈B
Vs(Bb(ϕ→ ψ)),min
b∈B
Vs(Bbϕ)} ≤min
b∈B
Vs(Bbψ)
Ô⇒ Vs(EB(ϕ→ ψ) ∧EBϕ) ≤ Vs(EBψ)
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and so Vs(EB(ϕ → ψ) ∧EBϕ→ EBψ) = 1.
(Induction step) Assume that Vs(EiB(ϕ → ψ) ∧ EiBϕ → EiBψ) = 1, for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We check that Vs(En+1B (ϕ → ψ) ∧En+1B ϕ → En+1B ψ) = 1.
By induction hypothesis and the admissibility of (R2) the following
equation is obtained:
Vs(BB(EnB(ϕ→ ψ) ∧EnBϕ→ EnBψ)) = 1
Using Proposition 2.7 part (ii), it is demonstrated that for each b ∈ B:
Vs(Bb(EnB(ϕ→ ψ) ∧EnBϕ)→ BbEnBψ) = 1
Also, by Proposition (2.7), part (iv), we obtain the following equation
for each b ∈ B:
Vs(BbEnB(ϕ→ ψ) ∧BbEnBϕ→ BbEnBψ) = 1
Therefore, for all b ∈ B:
min{Vs(BbEnB(ϕ → ψ)), Vs(BbEnBϕ)} ≤ Vs(BbEnBψ),
min
b∈B
{min{Vs(BbEnB(ϕ→ ψ)), Vs(BbEnBϕ)}} ≤min
b∈B
Vs(BbEnBψ),
min{min
b∈B
Vs(BbEnB(ϕ→ ψ)),min
b∈B
Vs(BbEnBϕ)} ≤min
b∈B
Vs(BbEnBψ),
min {Vs(En+1B (ϕ → ψ)), Vs(En+1B ϕ)} ≤minVs(En+1B ψ),
and consequently
Vs(En+1B (ϕ→ ψ) ∧En+1B ϕ→ En+1B ψ) = 1. 
Corollary 4.5. For each n ∈ N, En
B
(ϕ → EBϕ) → EnBϕ is valid in all
reflexive CEGL-models.
Proof. Let M = (S, ra∣a∈A , pi) be a reflexive CEGL-model and s ∈ S. We
show by induction on n that (En
B
(ϕ→ EBϕ)→ EnBϕ) is valid in (M,s).
(Basis) By Lemma 4.4 part (i), the formula EB(ϕ → EBϕ) → (ϕ →
EBϕ) is valid in all reflexive CEGL-models, so Vs(EB(ϕ→ EBϕ)∧ϕ →
EBϕ) = 1. Since by Lemma 4.4 part (i), Vs(EBϕ) ≤ Vs(ϕ), then we
have Vs(EB(ϕ → EBϕ)) ≤ Vs(EBϕ). Therefore, Vs(EB(ϕ → EBϕ) →
EBϕ) = 1.
(Induction step) Assume that Vs(EnB(ϕ → EBϕ) → EnBϕ)=1, then we
show that Vs(En+1B (ϕ → EBϕ) → En+1B ϕ) = 1. By induction hypoth-
esis and Proposition 4.3, it is obtained that Vs(EB(EnB(ϕ → EBϕ) →
En
B
ϕ))) = 1. So Vs(En+1B (ϕ → EBϕ)→ En+1B ϕ) = 1, by using Lemma 4.4
part (iv). 
Proposition 4.6. The following formulas are valid in all reflexive
CEGL-models.
(1) EBϕ→ Baϕ
(2) CBϕ→ EBϕ
(3) CB(ϕ→ ψ) ∧CBϕ→ CBψ
(4) CB(ϕ→ EBϕ)→ (ϕ→ CBϕ)
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Proof. The parts (1) and (2) can be shown easily. LetM = (S, ra∣a∈A , pi)
be a reflexive CEGL-model and s ∈ S. We show (3) and (4) are valid
in (M,s).
Proof of (3). Using Lemma 4.4 we have
min{Vs(CBϕ→ ψ), Vs(CBϕ)} =min{ inf
i∈N
Vs(EiBϕ→ ψ), inf
i∈N
Vs(EiBϕ)}
≤ inf
i∈N
min{Vs(EiBϕ→ ψ), Vs(EiBϕ)} ≤ inf
i∈N
Vs(EiBψ) = Vs(CBψ)
Hence, Vs(CB(ϕ → ψ) ∧CBϕ→ CBψ) = 1
Proof of (4). By Corollary 4.5, Vs(EiB(ϕ → EBϕ)) ≤ Vs(EiBϕ), for all
i ∈ N. Then, inf i∈N Vs(EiB(ϕ→ EBϕ)) ≤ inf i∈N Vs(EiBϕ), so
Vs(CB(ϕ → EBϕ)) ≤ Vs(CBϕ).
Therefore, Vs(CB(ϕ→ EBϕ) ∧ϕ) ≤ Vs(CBϕ) and consequently
Vs(CB(ϕ→ EBϕ)→ (ϕ → CBϕ)) = 1 
Remark 4.7. The formula CB(ϕ → ψ) ∧ CBϕ → CBψ, in part (3) of
Proposition 4.6, is also valid in all non-reflexive CEGL-models.
5. A dynamic extension of EGL
Definition 5.1. (Action Model) Let L be any logical language. An
action model A is a structure A = (E,ua∣a∈A , pre) such that
● E is a non-empty finite set of actions,
● for each a ∈ A, ua ∶ E × E → [0,1] is a (indistinguishing)
function, which for each e ∈ E, ua(e, e) = 1,
● pre ∶ E → L is a function which assigns a precondition pre(e) ∈
L, to each action e ∈ E. We denote pre(e) by pree.
Definition 5.2. The set of formulas of dynamic epistemic Go¨del logic
(briefly, DEGL) are defined as follows:
ϕ ∶∶= p ∣  ∣ ϕ ∧ϕ ∣ ϕ→ ϕ ∣ Baϕ ∣ [A,e]ϕ
where, A = (E,ua∣a∈A , pre) is an action model whose language L is
defined by the following BNF:
χ ∶∶= G(ψ) = g ∣ G(ψ) > g ∣  ∣ χ ∧ χ ∣ χ→ χ
in which,
ψ ∶∶= p ∣  ∣ ψ ∧ ψ ∣ ψ → ψ ∣ Baψ
where, p ∈ P, a ∈ A, e ∈ E and g ∈ [0,1]. We call [A,e]ϕ the updating
formula and we refer to G(ψ) = g and G(ψ) > g as G-formulas.
Intuitively, G(ψ) = g says that the truth value of ψ is g and G(ψ) > g
says that the truth value of ψ is strictly greater than g.
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In the language L, the formulas ¬ϕ, ϕ∨ψ and ϕ↔ ψ are defined as
similar as GL. Moreover, further connectives are defined as follows:
G(ϕ) ≥ g ∶= G(ϕ) = g ∨G(ϕ) > g
G(ϕ) ≤ g ∶= ¬(G(ϕ) > g)
G(ϕ) < g ∶= ¬(G(ϕ) ≥ g)
Definition 5.3. A DEGL-model is a structure M = (S, ra∣a∈A , pi) in
which S, ra∣a∈A and pi are defined analogous to their definition in the
EGL-models, but the expansion V of pi is also defined on updating and
G-formulas as follows:
● Vs(G(ϕ) = g) = { 1 Vs(ϕ) = g0 otherwise
● Vs(G(ϕ) > g) = { 1 Vs(ϕ) > g0 otherwise
● Vs([A,e]ϕ) = { V ′(s,e)(ϕ) (s, e) ∈ S′1 otherwise
where, V ′
(s,e)
(ϕ) is defined below. Also note that the G-formulas take
crisp values.
Definition 5.4. (Product Model) LetM = (S, ra∣a∈A , pi) be a DEGL-
model and A = (E,ua∣a∈A , pre) be an action model. Then, updating M
by A is defined by the product model M ×A = (S′, r′
a∣a∈A
, pi′), where:
● S′ = {(s, e) ∣ s ∈ S, e ∈ E,Vs(pree) = 1} is the set of states,
● for each a ∈ A, r′a ∶ S′ × S′ → [0,1] is a function, which for all(s1, e1), (s2, e2) ∈ S′:
r′a((s1, e1), (s2, e2)) = min{ra(s1, s2), ua(e1, e2)}
We call it the indistinguishing function,
● pi′ ∶ S′ × P → [0,1] is a valuation function, which for each(s, e) ∈ S′ and each p ∈ P, we have pi′((s, e), p) = pi(s, p).
The function pi′ can be extended to all DEGL-formulas, naturally. We
use the silmilar notation V ′ for the extended function.
Proposition 5.5. Let ϕ be a DEGL-formula. The following formulas
are valid in all DEGL-models.
(1) [A,e]p↔ (pree → p)
(2) [A,e]¬ϕ↔ (pree → ¬[A,e]ϕ)
(3) [A,e](ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ ([A,e]ϕ ∧ [A,e]ψ)
(4) [A,e]Baϕ→ (pree → Ba[A,e]ϕ)
(5) ⋀
e′∈E,ua(e,e′)≠0
Ba[A,e′]ϕ→ [A,e]Baϕ
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Proof. We only prove parts (4) and (5). Other parts can be proved in a
similar fashion more easily. Assume that M = (S, ra∣a∈A , pi) is a DEGL-
model, A = (E,ua∣a∈A , pre) is an action model, M ×A = (S′, r′a∣a∈A , pi′) is
the product model corresponding to the update of M by A, s ∈ S and
e ∈ E.
Proof of (4) If Vs(pree) = 1, then
Vs([A,e]Baϕ) = V ′(s,e)(Baϕ)
= min
(s′,e′)∈S′
max{1 − r′a((s, e), (s′, e′)), V ′(s′,e′)(ϕ)}
= min
(s′,e′)∈S′
max{1 −min{ra(s, s′), ua(e, e′)}, V ′(s′,e′)(ϕ)}
= min
(s′,e′)∈S′
max{max{1 − ra(s, s′),1 − ua(e, e′)}, V ′(s′,e′)(ϕ)}
= min
(s′,e′)∈S′
max{1 − ra(s, s′), V ′(s′,e′)(ϕ),1 − ua(e, e′)}
and so we have
Vs([A,e]Baϕ) = min{min
s′∈S
max{1 − ra(s, s′), V ′(s′,e)(ϕ),1 − ua(e, e)},
min
(s′,e′)∈S′,e′≠e
max{1 − ra(s, s′), V ′(s′,e′)(ϕ),1 − ua(e, e′)}}
=min{Vs(Ba[A,e]ϕ), min
(s′,e′)∈S′,e′≠e
max{1−ra(s, s′), V ′(s′,e′)(ϕ),1−ua(e, e′)}}
Therefore, Vs([A,e]Baϕ) ≤ Vs(Ba[A,e]ϕ) and hence
Vs([A,e]Baϕ→ Ba[A,e]ϕ) = 1.
Otherwise, if Vs(pree) = 0, then Vs([A,e]Baϕ ∧ pree) ≤ Vs(Ba[A,e]ϕ),
which completes the proof.
Proof of (5) We consider two cases. In first case Vs(pree) = 1, then for
each e′ ∈ E which ua(e, e′) ≠ 0, we have the following equation:
Vs(Ba[A,e′]ϕ) =min
s′∈S
max{1 − ra(s, s′), Vs′([A,e′]ϕ)}
=min
s′∈S
max{1 − ra(s, s′), V ′(s′,e′)(ϕ)}
Similar to the proof of part (4), it can be obtained that
Vs([A,e]Baϕ) = min{max{1−ra(s, s′), V ′(s′,e′)(ϕ),1 − ua(e, e′)}
∣ s′ ∈ S, e′ ∈ E,ua(e, e′) ≠ 0, Vs′(pree′) = 1}
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and consequently
Vs( ⋀
e′∈E,ua(e,e′)≠0
Ba[A,e′]ϕ) = min
e′∈E,ua(e,e′)≠0
min
s′∈S
max{1 − ra(s, s′), V ′(s′,e′)(ϕ)}
≤ min
e′∈E,ua(e,e′)≠0
min
s′∈S
max{1 − ra(s, s′), V ′(s′,e′)(ϕ),1 − ua(e, e′)}
≤ min
(s′,e′)∈S′,ua(e,e′)≠0
max{1 − ra(s, s′), V ′(s′,e′)(ϕ),1 − ua(e, e′)}
= Vs([A,e]Baϕ)
So, Vs( ⋀
e′∈E,ua(e,e′)≠0
Ba[A,e′]ϕ → [A,e]Baϕ) = 1. In the other case
Vs(pree) = 0, then by definition it can be obtained that Vs([A,e]Baϕ) =
1, which completes the proof. 
Example 5.6. (Updating the fuzzy muddy children) In this
example an update of Example 2.4 of fuzzy muddy children is given.
For each agent a ∈ A, we consider a new parameter Ha ∈ [0,1] as the
amount of hearing impairment of the agent a. If E = {e1, . . . , em} is the
set of actions, then for each a ∈ A and 1 ≤ i, j ≤m, the indistinguishing
function ua is defined as follows:
ua(ei, ej) = { Ha i ≠ j1 i = j
We suppose that A = {a, b} and somebody makes an announcement
about two things: (1) number of agents with muddy face (2) the amount
of mud in each muddy face. Then, E = {e1, e2} while pree1 says ”The
face of exactly one of the agents is at least a little muddy” and pree2
says ”The face of exactly one of the agents is a little muddy”. We
consider the value 1
2
as being a little muddy. So, the pre-conditions are
the following formulas:
pree1 ∶= (G(ma) ≥ 12 ∨G(mb) ≥
1
2
) ∧ ¬(G(ma) ≥ 1
2
∧G(mb) ≥ 1
2
)
pree2 ∶= (G(ma) = 12 ∨G(mb) =
1
2
) ∧ ¬(G(ma) = 1
2
∧G(mb) = 1
2
)
Also, we suppose that Ha = 0,Hb = 0.75. Then the indistinguishing
functions ua, ub are defined as follows:
ua(ei, ej) = { 0 i ≠ j1 i = j ub(ei, ej) = { 0.75 i ≠ j1 i = j
Thus, the definition of action model A = (E,ua∣a∈A , pre) is completely
done. Now we update the modelM in Example 2.4 by the action model
A. The product model M ×A = (S′, r′
a∣a∈A
, pi′) is defined as follows:
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● The set of states S′ is as follows:
S′ ={((0, 1
2
), e1), ((0,1), e1), ((1
2
,0), e1), ((1,0), e1)
, ((0, 1
2
), e2), ((1
2
,0), e2), ((1, 1
2
), e2), ((1
2
,1), e2)}
● Let (i, j), (i′, j′) ∈ S′ and k ∈ {1,2}. Then the indistinguishing
functions are defined as below:
r′a(((i, j), ek), ((i′, j′), ek)) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 ∣j − j′∣ = 0
0.36 ∣j − j′∣ = 1
2
0.32 ∣j − j′∣ = 1
r′a(((i, j), e1), ((i′, j′), e2)) = 0
r′b(((i, j), ek), ((i′, j′), ek)) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 ∣i − i′∣ = 0
0.81 ∣i − i′∣ = 1
2
0.72 ∣i − i′∣ = 1
r′b(((i, j), e1), ((i′, j′), e2)) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0.75 ∣i − i′∣ = 0
0.75 ∣i − i′∣ = 1
2
0.72 ∣i − i′∣ = 1
● The valuation function on atomic propositions ma,mb are de-
fined as follows:
pi′((i, j), ek),ma) = i
pi′((i, j), ek),mb) = j
where, (i, j) ∈ S′ and k ∈ {1,2}.
Conclusions
We introduced some epistemic extensions of Go¨del logic. We es-
tablished two deductive systems which are sound and weak complete
with respect to the corresponding Kripke semantics. Afterwards, we
enriched the language of epistemic Go¨del logic with two operators for
group and common Knowledge and proposed the corresponding seman-
tics. Moreover, by introducing an action model approach, we gave a
dynamic extension of the epistemic Go¨del logic. Also, we derived the
validity of some formulas in the language of dynamic extension.
For the future work, if one can extend Proposition 5.5, such that it
gives a translation from DEGL to (static) epistemic Go¨del logic, then
one can prove soundness and weak completeness for DEGL.
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